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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF "PATTERN AND PRACTICE"
CASES: WHAT TO DO WHEN THE INS ACTS
UNLAWFULLY
Robert Pauw*
There is no doubt that the decisions made under our immigration laws
can visit tragic personal consequences upon individuals living in our
communities. Deportation may deprive a person of "all that makes life
worth living; it is "a sanction which in severity surpasses all but the
most Draconian criminal penalties."2 In some cases, the decisions made
by the Immigration Service mean the difference between living with
loved ones and living in exile; between economic well-being and total
impoverishment; between refuge and torture or execution. For this
reason, few, if any, will gainsay that a system of judicial review is
essential in the immigration context.
The question, however, is when and how such judicial review should
occur. As to review of orders of deportation, under § 106(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (NA), 3 review occurs on an individual,
case-by-case basis, after all administrative appeals have been exhausted.4
Generally, judicial review is limited to review in the federal courts of
appeals, and the district courts lack jurisdiction.5
The decisions of interest in this article-decisions made by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Immigration Service) in
implementing the legalization program 6 -are generally subject to judicial
review in the courts of appeal under § 106.' The courts of appeal review
these decisions on a case-by-case basis after the completion of
administrative reviews, and the district courts generally lack jurisdiction
to review them.
* Partner, Gibbs Houston Pauw, Seattle, Washington; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of
Washington, Seattle University. I would like to thank Professor Joan Fitzpatrick, University of
Washington School of Law, and Professor Stephen Legomsky, Washington University School of
Law, for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922).
2. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37,39 (2d Cir. 1977).
3. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994).
4.
5.
6.
7.

INA § 106(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c).
INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a).
See INA § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a; INA § 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1160.
INA § 245A(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4); § 210(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3).
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Several district and appellate courts, however, have recognized a
"pattern and practice" exception to § 106. This pattern and practice
exception is not universally recognized,9 and in the circuits that do not
recognize the exception each individual subject to the all.egedly unlawful
pattern and practice must seek judicial review on an :individual basis,
appealing to the court of appeals pursuant to the provisions of § 106 after
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Many such pattern and practice cases have been filed :in the past, 0 and
we can expect that such cases will continue to arise in the! future." At this
point, it is unsettled whether and under what circumstances district courts
have jurisdiction to hear pattern and practice cases. In this article, I
consider the case law that has developed in the context of the legalization
program. In part I, I describe the legalization program established by
Congress and explain the unlawful manner in which the program was
implemented by the Immigration Service, adversely affecting hundreds
of thousands of applicants. In part II, I argue that these unlawful policies
are best addressed in pattern and practice lawsuits in the district courts
rather than in individual case-by-case review. Finally, in part III, I
describe the case law that has limited the district courts' jurisdiction to
hear such pattern and practice cases, arguing that the cases have not gone
far enough in recognizing the benefits of pattern and practice lawsuits.

8. By a "pattern and practice" lawsuit, I mean a lawsuit in which a plaintiff er plaintiffs allege that
an agency has adopted or follows an unlawful policy or practice that adversely affects a whole class
of individuals. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982); National
Ctr. for Immigrants Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
9. See, e.g., Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated, 498 U.S. 1117
(1991); 948 F.2d 742,751 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
10. See, e.g., Campos v. Nail, 940 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1991); Montes v. Thomburgh, 919 F.2d 531
(9th Cir. 1990); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); ABC v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); Alfaro-Orellana v. llchert, 720 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Ramos v. Thomburgh,
732 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Roshan v. Smith, 615 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1985); Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
11. At least two commentators have expressed the view that INS is institutionally incapable of
providing fair adjudication and effective services to immigrants. This problem is inherent in the
agency because INS is charged with both enforcement duties and service duties, and because INS
has predominantly an enforcement orientation. See Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang,
Continuity and Change:PatternsofImmigrationLitigationin the Courts, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 154,
177 n.296 (1992).

Judicial Review of Pattern and Practice Cases
I.

THE LEGALIZATION PROGRAM

The legalization program, created when Congress passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),' 2 was the result of
a growing awareness of the social problems caused because millions of
individuals were living in the United States in an unlawful immigration
status. 3 IRCA had the dual purpose of legalizing many of those
individuals already living in the United States in an unlawful
immigration status and also making it more difficult for new immigrants
to enter the United States unlawfully. To accomplish the latter objective,
Congress adopted the so-called employer sanction provisions, requiring
all employers to verify that their workers have authorization to work in
the United States.14 To accomplish the former objective, Congress
created the legalization program.
The major purpose of the legalization program was to grant legal
immigration status to a large class of individuals who had been living in
the United States in an undocumented status for several years. The House
Judiciary Committee explained:
The United States has a large undocumented alien population living
and working within its borders. Many of these people have been
here for a number of years and have become a part of their
communities. Many have strong family ties which include U.S.
citizens and lawful residents. They have built social networks in
this country. They have contributed to the United States in myriad
ways, including providing their talents, labor and tax dollars.
However, because of their undocumented status, these people live
in fear, afraid to seek help when their rights are violated, when they
are victimized by criminals, employers or landlords or when they
become ill.
The Committee believes that the solution lies in legalizing the
status of aliens who have been present in the United States for
12. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
13. According to most estimates, there were between four million and six million individuals
living in the United States without proper immigration documents, with at least a couple hundred
thousand being added to that number each year. John Crewdson, The Tarnished Door 105-06
(1983). See also Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), U.S. Immigration
Policy and the NationalInterest 73 (Jt. Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter Final Report].
14. INA § 274A requires employers to verify that workers have proper work authorization, and
subjects employers to monetary penalties for the failure to verify employment authorization and for
hiring workers knowing that they are not authorized to work. INA § 274A(e)(4),(5), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(e)(4), (5) (1994).
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several years, recognizing that past failures to enforces [sic] the
immigration laws have allowed them to enter and to settle here."
A.

The Basic EligibilityRequirementsfor Legalization

In creating the legalization program, Congress established a cut-off
date of January 1, 1982 and indicated its desire to legalize as many
persons as possible who had been living unlawfully in the United States
since before that date. 6 Generally, the only persons to be excluded from
the program were those who had been convicted of certain criminal
offenses or who had engaged in the persecution of others. 7 In order to
accomplish the goals of the legalization program, Congress established
four basic and straightforward eligibility requirements.

In order to qualify for legalization an applicant had to establish
unlawful immigration status as of January 1, 1982, and continuous
residence in the United States since that date. For persons who crossed
the border surreptitiously and without inspection, it was enough to prove
the date of entry to the United States and continuous residence. Persons
who entered the United States in a lawful status before Iranuary 1, 1982,
15. H.R. Rep. No. 682(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5653 [hereinafter 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.]. In its Final Report to Congress, SCIRP made similar
findings:
The Select Commission holds the view that the existence of a large undocumented/illegal
migrant population should not be tolerated. The costs to society of permitting a large group of
persons to live in illegal, second-class status are enormous. Society is harmed every time an
undocumented alien is afraid to testify as a witness in a legal proceeding (which occurs even
when he/she is the victim), to report an illness that may constitute a pub ic health hazard or
disclose a violation of U.S. labor laws.
Final Report, supra note 13, at 72.
A second purpose of legalization was to ameliorate the enforcement problerrs INS was facing. If a
large class of undocumented immigrants living in the United States could be 1.egalized, then the INS
would be able to concentrate its resources more effectively on preventing new illegal entries into the
United States. Congress believed that the alternative of attempting mass deportations would be
costly, ineffective and inconsistent with this country's immigrant heritage. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
supra, at 5653. See also Final Report, supra note 13, at 74-75.
16. The Act "requires the Attorney General to grant legal status to those aliens who have been in
the United States a substantial number of years... "'1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., stpra note 15, at 5675.
Congress expected that one of the main difficulties facing potential applicants would be their ability
to document residence in the United States since 1981. "Unnecessarily rigid demands for proof of
eligibility for legalization could seriously impede the success of the legalization effort." Id. at 5677.
Therefore, Congress expected the INS to "incorporate flexibility into the star.dards for legalization
eligibility, permitting the use of affidavits of credible witnesses and taking nto consideration the
special circumstances relating to persons previously living clandestinely in this country." Id.
17. Id. at 5676.

Judicial Review of Pattern and Practice Cases
such as persons who entered with a nonimmigrant visa, were required to
prove either that the period of authorized stay expired before January 1,
1982, or that they violated their status in a manner that was "known to
the Government.""8
IRCA also required that applicants maintain continuous physical
presence in the United States after November 6, 1986 (the date of
enactment of IRCA), with the exception of "brief, casual and innocent"
departures from the United States. 9

An applicant for legalization was required to be "admissible as an

immigrant," that is, not subject to the grounds of exclusion specified
in
INA § 212(a).2" In adopting this requirement, Congress was primarily
concerned with disqualifying those who had been convicted of certain
serious crimes or had persecuted others.21 Thus Congress specified that
certain of these grounds of exclusion were not applicable for purposes of
the legalization program z and many of the grounds of exclusion could
be waived.' Only certain grounds of exclusion, primarily those relating

18. INA § 245A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(2) (1994). See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
Thus, nonimmigrants who worked without authorization and who had tax records or social security
records to prove it, would be eligible because the violation of status was "known to the
Government" See Doris M. Meissner & Demetrios G. Papademetriou, The Legalization Countdown:
A Third QuarterAssessment 31-32 (1988). Similarly, students who dropped out of school before
January 1, 1982, would have violated status in a manner "known to the Government" because
schools were required to report such violations to INS. See 8C.F.L § 214.3(g) (1995).
19. The term "brief, casual and innocent" is a term of art in immigration law, first coined by the
Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). In Fleuti the Court held that a lawful
permanent resident of the United States who travelled to Tijuana for an afternoon had maintained
continuous physical presence in the United States for immigration purposes and was not subject to
exclusion upon his return to the United States. The term has been interpreted and explained by the
lower courts in many cases since Fleuti. See, ag., Toon-Ming Wong v. INS, 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir.
1966) (6-month absence to Canada by a minor); Itzcovitz v. Selective Service Local Board No. 6,
447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1971) (3-week trip out of the U.S. to attend a training course for employer);
Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979) (30-day trip to Thailand to visit
relatives); Jubilado v. INS, 819 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1987) (3-month absence from U.S. to wind up
affairs in Philippines and bring family to the United States); Molina v. Sewell, 983 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.
1993) (departure while under deportation proceedings may be "innocent, casual, and brief").
20. 8U.S.C.§ 1182.
21. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., supranote 15, at 5676.
22. Technical and documentary grounds of exclusion were automatically waived. INA
§ 245A(d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(A).
23. For example, Congress made waivers available for applicants who were excludable because
they had been previously deported, who had committed fraud in obtaining immigration documents,
and who had unlawfully smuggled aliens into the United States. INA § 245A(d)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i). Congress specifically directed that these waivers should be generously granted,
and normally approved unless the applicant also falls under a non-waivable ground of exclusion.
H.R. Rep. No. 115,98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 69-70 (1983).
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to criminal convictions and persecution, could not be waived and
constituted an absolute basis for disqualification from the program.2 4
Finally, Congress required that applicants file applications for
legalization during a one year application period,25 which the
Immigration Service designated to be from May 5, 1987, to May 4,
1988.26
B.

INS's Implementation of the Legalization Program

In enacting IRCA, Congress directed the Immigration Service to
implement the legalization program "in a liberal and generous" manner.27
The program was targeted at the millions of individuals who had been
living in the United States since before the cut-off date of January 1,
1982, and Congress believed that it was important that as many of these
individuals as possible be legalized in order to "ensure tre resolution of
the problem and to ensure that the program will be a one-time-only
program. 2 8
INS's implementation of the legalization program was anything but
"liberal and generous" and in fact was designed, at every step along the
way, to disqualify as many individuals as possible. The Immigration
Service interpreted the eligibility requirements in an extremely restrictive
manner, reading the statute unfavorably against the applicant at every
possible juncture and providing few procedural safeguards to prevent
inaccurate determinations. In the words of one court, the interpretation
given by the Immigration Service "is truly remarkable in the violence it
does to the spirit and purpose of the Act it purports to implement....
[T]he INS view.., goes beyond a narrow reading; it is almost overtly
hostile to the legalization program itself." 9

24. There were no waivers available for persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude or of
controlled substance violations. INA § 245A(d)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(dj(2)(B)(ii). In addition,
persons convicted of one felony or three or more misdemeanors and persons who had assisted in the
persecution of others were disqualified from the legalization program. INA §§ 245A(a)(4)(B), (C), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1255a(a)(4)(B), (C).

25. INA § 245A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1).
26. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(a) (1995).
27. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 15, at 5676.
28. Id.
29. Gutierrez v. Ilchert, 682 F. Supp. 467,474 (N.D. Cal. 1988).

Judicial Review of Pattern and Practice Cases
1.

Violation of Status "Known to the Government"

Congress provided that persons who entered the United States on
nonimmigrant visas could establish eligibility by showing that they
violated their status in a manner that was "known to the Government."
This provision was designed to include students and other
nonimmigrants who violated their status before January 1, 1982, for
example, by working without authorization, and could verify such
violation through records from the government.30
The Immigration Service took the position that there was no
"government" other than itself. According to INS regulations, "known to
the government" meant "known to the Immigration Service,"'" and a
person's unlawful status was not "known to the Government" unless,
prior to January 1, 1982, (1) the applicant had made a "clear statement"
to a federal agency that he or she was unlawfully in the United States,
and that information was transferred to INS and maintained in the
applicant's immigration file; or (2) INS had made an "affirmative
determination" that the person was unlawfully in the United States.32 By
means of this regulation, the INS effectively disqualified almost every
applicant who had entered the United States before January 1, 1982, on a
nonimmigrant visa, except for those whose period of authorized stay
expired before January 1, 1982."3
2.

Continuous Unlawful Residence

IRCA provides that in order to qualify for legalization, an applicant
must establish that he or she entered the United States before January 1,
1982, and "has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful
status" since that date.34 The Immigration Service used the requirement
of continuous unlawful status as a perverse basis for disqualifying
otherwise eligible individuals. According to INS policy, any legalization
30. See, e.g., Meissner & Papademetriou, supranote 18.

31. 8 C.F.1L § 245a.l(d) (1995).
32. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(d)(1), (2).
33. According to one estimate, up to 50,000 persons may have been disqualified from
legalization. See Meissner & Papademelriou, supra note 18, at 32. The INS regulation defining
"known to the Government" was struck down in Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C.
1988). Accord Immigration Assistance Project of the L.A. County Fed'n of Labor v. INS, 709 F.
Supp. 998,717 F. Supp. 1444 (W.D. Wash. 1989), aff'dsub nom. Legalization Assistance Project of
the L.A. County Fed'n of Labor v. INS, 976 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded,113
S. Ct. 2637 (1993).

34. INA § 245A(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (1994).
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applicant who travelled outside the United States after January 1, 1982,
and returned with a nonimmigrant visa or other border crossing card
would be deemed to have been, at least momentarily, in a lawful status
and therefore disqualified from the legalization program.
This interpretation was completely at odds with the law that had
developed prior to IRCA. Traditionally, by violating one's status as a
nonimmigrant, for example, by working without authorization, and
remaining in the United States, an applicant would be regarded as having
remained in an unlawful status at all times. This would be true even
though the person held a visa that was facially valid and even if the
person departed from the United States and reentered with a
nonimmigrant visa or other entry document.36
As a result of the INS's interpretation of the requirement to maintain
continuous unlawful status, thousands of individuals otherwise eligible
for legalization were automatically disqualified from the program.37
3.

"Brief,Casualand Innocent"Absences

Where Congress provided that "brief, casual and innocent" departures
after November 6, 1986, would not break an applicant's continuous
physical presence, the Immigration Service inexplicably specified that an
applicant who had departed from the United States would be disqualified
unless he or she had first obtained advance perirssion from the
Immigration Service to travel outside the United States.3 8 This
interpretation was clearly inconsistent with the case law that had
developed interpreting the term "brief, casual and innocent,"39 and as a
35. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(8).
36. See, e.g., Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441-42 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,467 U.S.
1219 (1984); United States v. Shaughnessy, 221 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 195.5); Del Castillo v. Carr,
100 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1938); Matter of I.L., 7 L & N. Dec. 233 (BIA 1956); In the Matter of M, 6 1.
& N. Dec. 752 (BIA 1955); Matter of H, I L & N. Dec. 166 (BIA 1941); Matter of Martinez-Lopez,
10 1. &N. Dec. 409 (Atty. Gen. 1964).
37. This policy was challenged in LULAC v. INS, Civ. No. 87-4757-WDIC (C.D. Cal. 1988), and
as a result of the lawsuit the Immigration Service changed its position. See 11C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(9),
52 Fed. Reg. 43,843, at 43,845-46 (1987); 64 Interpreter Releases 1307, 1308 (1987).

38. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(g).
39. See supra note 19. Under the established case law, an absence would be determined to be
"brief, casual and innocent" depending on the purpose of the departure, th .- length of the absence
from the United States, and whether the departure reflected a meaningful interruption of the
applicant's stay in the United States. See, eg., Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
1979). No court has ever held that an absence fails the "brief, casual and innocent" test merely
because the applicant failed to obtain advance parole from the Immigration Service before the
departure.
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result, thousands of individuals who might otherwise have been eligible
for legalization were disqualified from the program °
4.

Waiversfor Grounds of Exclusion

In enacting IRCA, Congress was aware that many potential applicants
would have been previously apprehended by the Immigration Service
and deported from the United States. Congress created a special waiver
for such persons, as well as for the benefit of other applicants who fell
under one or more of the grounds of exclusion, and determined that such
applicants could be approved for purposes of preserving family unity,
humanitarian reasons, or when it was otherwise in the public interest.
Congress explained:
The Committee expects the Attorney General to examine the
legalization applications in which there is a waivable ground of
exclusion carefully, but sympathetically ....
In most case [sic],
denials of legalization on the basis of the waivable exclusions
should only occur when the applicant also falls
within one of the
41
specified nonwaiverable grounds of exclusion.
In implementing the legalization program, the Immigration Service
took the position that certain applicants who fell under the waivable
grounds of exclusion, such as those persons who had been previously
deported from the United States, were not eligible for legalization, and
their waiver requests would automatically be denied.42
5.

Receipt of PublicAssistance

A person who had previously received public assistance could
potentially be disqualified from the legalization program on the basis of a
finding that he or she was "likely at any time to become a public
charge." 43 Such a finding would make the applicant excludable under
INA § 212(a) and therefore not "admissible as an immigrant." 44 Instead

40. The INS regulation defining "brief, casual and innocent" was struck down in Catholic Social
Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
41. H.R. Rep. No. 115, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 69-70 (1983).
42. This policy was invalidated in Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, 784 F. Supp. 738 (D. Ariz. 1991),
appealpending.
43. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1994).
44. See INA § 245A(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4); see also INA § 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(5); INA § 244A(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(4).
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of disqualifying these applicants, Congress adopted a "special rule" for
purposes of determining public charge. According to this special rule an
applicant would not be disqualified if he or she could demonstrate a

history of employment showing self-support without the receipt of public
cash assistance.45
The Immigration Service, in implementing this provision, required an
applicant to show not only self-support, but also the capacity to maintain
his or her entire family without public cash assistance.46 As a result,
many individuals who were able to support themselves but who had U.S.
citizen family members who had received public assistance were
disqualified from the legalization program.47
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

As a result of INS's improper implementation of IRCA, literally
hundreds of thousands of individuals were improperly disqualified from
legalization, individuals whom, according to the courts, Congress
intended to legalize. 4' Although several of these courts determined that
the federal district courts have jurisdiction to review INS regulations and
policies, the orders in these cases are not yet final and it is still an open
question whether and to what extent the district courts have jurisdiction
to entertain pattern and practice lawsuits.
It is the thesis of this article that the issues that arise in pattern and
practice cases are best addressed in the context of pattern and practice
lawsuits before the federal district court. This thesis is consistent with the
45. INA § 245A(d)(2)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii).
46. Under INS regulations, the public charge ground of exclusion would be lifted only for an
applicant who could "showf the ability to support himself and his or her family... [and] the
capacity to exist on his or her income and maintainhis or herfamily without recourse to public cash
assistance." 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4) (1995) (emphasis added). The regulations deemed an applicant
"likely to become a public charge" unless he or she "demonstrat[ed] a histoy of employment in the
United States evidencing self-support without the receipt of public cash assistance." 8 C.F.R.
§ 245a.2(d)(4). "Public cash assistance" was defined to mean any "income or needs-based monetary
assistance... received by the alien or his o her immediatefamily members." 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(i)
(emphasis added).
47. Again, INS's policies were challenged in federal district court on behalf of the thousands of
applicants adversely affected. The courts determined that INS's regulation was inconsistent with
IRCA and therefore unlawful, and ordered INS to change its policy. ?erales v. Thornburgh,
967 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 3027 (1993), decision on remand, 48 F.3d 1305
(1995) (holding that INS did not violate statutory and due process rights); Zambrano v. Meese, Civ.
No. S-88-455EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug 9, 1988), aff'd, Zambrano v. INS, 972 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1992).
48. In all of the cases described above, the courts determined that the Immigration Service acted
unlawfully in implementing the legalization program.

Judicial Review of Pattern and Practice Cases
overall goals of administrative and judicial review. First, however, it is
necessary to describe the scheme established in the INA for the judicial
review of orders of deportation and legalization decisions.
A.

JudicialReview of Ordersof Deportationand Legalization
Decisions

If the Immigration Service believes that an alien is deportable from
the United States, it must issue an order to show cause and initiate
deportation proceedings before an immigration judge.4 9 If the
immigration judge determines that the person is deportable and denies
any relevant relief from deportation, 0 the person can appeal the decision
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).5 A final order of
deportation entered by the BIA is appealed directly to the appropriate
federal circuit court of appeals pursuant to § 106.52
In enacting IRCA, Congress established a special mechanism for
judicial review of legalization decisions that dovetails with the review
system established in § 106. An individual applying for legalization first
files an application and is interviewed at a local INS office. The
application is filed on a confidential basis, and the Immigration Service
is not permitted to use the information contained in an application to
locate and deport the applicant.53 If the application is denied, the
49. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a). In many cases, the Immigration Service does not institute formal
deportation proceedings, but instead convinces the alien to accept "voluntary departure" pursuant to
INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). If the Immigration Service wants to have the alien formally
deported, deportation proceedings must be initiated under INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and an
immigration judge makes a determination whether the person is deportable from the United States,
and if so, whether he or she is eligible for relief from deportation.
50. A person in deportation proceedings who is found to be deportable may be eligible for a
variety of forms of relief from deportation, including political asylum, withholding of deportation,
suspension of deportation, voluntary departure, and adjustment of status. INA §§ 208, 243 (h),
244(a), 244(e), 245; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1253(h), 1254(a), 1254(e), 1255.
51. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21.
52. The system for judicial review established in INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § l105a, is "the sole and
exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation" INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(a). The statute does allow for district court review of an order of deportation pursuant to a
writ of habeas corpus if the alien has been taken into custody under an order of deportation. INA
§ 106(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10). Orders of exclusion entered pursuant to INA § 236, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226, as opposed to orders of deportation entered pursuant to INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, are
appealed from the BIA to the federal district court.
53. INA § 245A(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5). The Immigration Service created an exception if
the applicant was deemed to be have committed fraud in the application or if the applicant was
"clearly ineligible." INS Legalization Wire #1, reprinted in 63 Interpreter Releases 1074 app. at
1087 (1986).
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applicant can file an appeal to the INS Legalization Appeals Unit
(LAU).54 Judicial review of the decision made by the LAU is delayed
until after the applicant is apprehended, placed in deportation
proceedings, ordered deported, exhausts administrative review in the
BIA, and eventually appeals to the court of appeals pursuant to § 106." 5
Thus, because the application is filed on a confidential basis,
applicants whose applications are denied will generally be able to remain
in the United States until they are later apprehended during an
independent encounter with the INS. Only later, if the Immigration
Service initiates deportation proceedings, the applicant is ordered
deported by the immigration judge, the order is affirmed by the BIA, and
the decision of the BIA is appealed to the court of appeals, will the
individual be able to obtain judicial review of the denial of the
legalization application in the court of appeals.5 6
B.

Goals ofAdministrative andJudicialReview

There are three primary goals of a system of administrative and
judicial review: efficiency, accuracy, and acceptability.'5 The role of the
district courts in pattern and practice litigation, and in particular the issue
of whether the district courts have jurisdiction to hear such cases, should
be determined by a consideration of whether these three goals are
impeded or facilitated by such review. As explained below, the pursuit of
all three of these goals weighs heavily in favor of district court review of
pattern and practice cases.

54. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(3). The LAU was one department within the INS's Administrative
Appeals Unit.

55. According to the special review mechanism established in IRCA, there is no judicial review of
"a determination respecting an application" except in the judicial review of an order of deportation
under § 106. INA § 245A(f)(4), 8U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4).
56. The immigration judge and the BIA have no jurisdiction to consider legalization applications.
On appeal to the court of appeals, presumably the administrative record created in deportation
proceedings will be consolidated with the administrative record created for purposes of the
legalization application, and both records will be available for review by the court of appeals.
57. Stephen Legomsky, Forum Choicesfor the Review ofAgency Adjudication: A Study of the
Immigration Process, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1297, 1313 (1986) (citing Roger Cramton, Administrative
ProcedureReform: The Effects ofS. 1663 on the Conduct ofFederalRule Proceedings, 16 Admin.
L. Rev. 108, 111-12 (1964)). Legomsky identifies consistency as a fourth goal of administrative and
judicial review. Id. For purposes of this paper, I will assume that the goal of -onsistency in decisions
is subsumed under the third goal of acceptability or fairness.

Judicial Review of Pattern and Practice Cases
1.

Efficiency

The goal of efficiency includes not only the objective of minimizing
monetary costs to the parties and to the public but also the objective of
reducing the waiting time for a final decision. These considerations
support district court review of pattern and practice cases. 8
First, the regulations and policies being challenged in pattern and
practice cases affect thousands of applicants. It is much more efficient to
deal with all of these cases in one pattern and practice lawsuit than to
have thousands of individual cases resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Second, there are special efficiency concerns under IRCA because
judicial review in individual cases is delayed until the review of a final
order of deportation. Because the legalization application process is
confidential, the applicant may remain in the United States for years after
the denial of the legalization application before the Immigration Service
locates the applicant and commences deportation proceedings. By that
time the applicant will have resided in the United States for well over
seven years and thus will be eligible to apply for suspension of
deportation. 9 Hence, when deportation proceedings are initiated against
a denied legalization applicant, the applicant will be entitled to a full
individual hearing concerning the application for suspension of
deportation. These hearings are time-intensive and require the
participation of an immigration judge, an INS trial attorney, and, if the
applicant can afford it, an attorney representing the applicant. If the
58. Initially, of course, it must be recognized that allowing jurisdiction in the district courts opens
up the possibility that plaintiffs will file lawsuits, and there will be costs associated with such
litigation in the district court. However, it is not likely that this will open a "floodgate" of pattern and
practice litigation. In fact, fewer than a dozen such pattern and practice cases have been filed
throughout the United States under IRCA. In Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 544 (1988), the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that allowing review of plaintiff's statutory claims against the
Veterans' Administration would "burden the courts . . . with expensive and time-consuming
litigation," noting that in the four circuits allowing judicial review of statutory challenges to V.A.
regulations, only eight such challenges had been filed. Id. at 545 n.9. See also Devine v. Cleland,
616 F.2d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 1980) (class action lawsuit challenging regulations under Veterans
Administration Act "will not spawn 'an inevitable increase in litigation with consequent burdens
upon the courts' .... [The matter will be settled in one lawsuit for more than 400 members.")
(quoting Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361,371 (1974)).
59. To be eligible to apply for suspension of deportation an applicant must have been physically
present in the United States for the preceding seven years, with the exception of brief, casual and
innocent departures; have good moral character during that period; and show that deportation would
cause extreme hardship. INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a). Legalization applicants who have resided
in the United States continuously, from a period prior to January 1, 1982, until the present, will
generally be eligible to apply for suspension of deportation, unless disqualified because of criminal
convictions.
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application is denied by the immigration judge, the case can be appealed
to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where the application is reviewed
by a panel of BIA board members.(' During this entire: process, there is
no judicial review of the lawfulness of the policies and practices adopted
in the legalization program. Thus, there will be no judiial review of the
validity of the INS regulation or practice until five, ten, or twenty years
later, which would be years after the closing of the legalization program
and the denial of thousands of applications.
Further, any relief granted at this remote time will accrue only to the
benefit of one single applicant. In such cases, the court of appeals is
incapable of granting class-wide relief, even when it becomes clear that
thousands of other similarly situated applicants were wrongfully denied.
Those individuals, whom Congress intended to legalize, will continue to
remain in an undocumented immigration status.
Thus, if there is no district court review of pattern and practice cases,
thousands of cases will have to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis,
many of which will involve lengthy administrative proceedings regarding
benefits other than legalization. This flood of litigation is avoidable if
district courts are allowed jurisdiction over the patt~ern and practice
lawsuits. In terms of allocation of resources and minimizing costs to the
parties, it is more sensible to allow district courts to hear one case at the
outset and resolve the issue for a class of applicants, than to force each
applicant to litigate the same issue on a case-by-case basis after lengthy
proceedings involving other immigration benefits.
Another efficiency-related concern relates to the record for review. At
least in some cases, because of procedural defects in the manner INS has
processed applications, the administrative record created is not adequate
for judicial review in individual cases.62 In each individual case, it would
60. In contrast, the application for legalization is adjudicated in a much more informal manner.
The applicant is initially interviewed informally by an INS examiner, wo is not an attorney. A
formal hearing with examination and cross-examination is not required. Th,. immigration judge and
INS trial attorneys are not involved. If the application is approved, that is the end of the case.
61. The inefficiency of this system is all the more evident in light of INS's practice of nonacquiescence. See Steve Y. Koh, Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decdons of U.S. Courts of
Appeal, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 430 (1991). Thus, the fact that a circuit court of appeals has held that
INS's regulation or policy is unlawful does not necessarily mean that tie INS will follow that
decision on an intercircuit or intracircuit basis. The INS may refuse to apply the law established in
one circuit to cases arising in another circuit. Id. at 442-45. The INS also may not follow the law that
has developed in cases arising within a circuit. Id. at 445-48.
62. For example, in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), the plaintiffs
alleged that under INS procedures, applicants were not informed of adver;e information and were
given no opportunity to respond to such information, that applicants wen not allowed to present
witnesses on their own behalf, and that non-English speaking applicants were not able to
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be possible for the court of appeals to remand the case for a new
decision, requiring the agency to follow proper procedures. However, it
is much more efficient for the district court to address the issues
immediately on a class-wide basis, correcting the defective procedures at
the outset.
Finally, it should be clear that immediate review in federal district
court of the pattern and practice lawsuit is more efficient because it
reduces the waiting time for a final decision. The district court is
equipped and authorized to hear class action lawsuits involving
regulations and policies affecting many applicants and can render a
decision expeditiously. In contrast, if district courts are held to have no
jurisdiction over pattern and practice lawsuits, then final decisions may
come years later, at different times and in different circuits, with the
regulation or practice remaining effective pending the final decisions.
2.

Accuracy

Accuracy, as a goal of the administrative and judicial process,
includes the objective of ascertaining the truth and making correct factual
determinations.63 But it is broader; it encompasses the goal of making
accurate legal determinations, in other words interpreting the relevant
statutory and constitutional provisions correctly.6 Whether this
consideration favors district court review or review in the court of
appeals may depend on the particular case and issue being resolved. In
the context of the legalization pattern and practice cases, though,
considerations of accuracy favor review in the federal district court.

communicate effectively with the interviewers because there were no competent translators. Under
these procedures, the administrative record created was inadequate forjudicial review. Id.
63. In individual legalization cases, where the adjudicator is called upon to make specific factual
determinations, such as when the applicant first entered the United States, where the applicant has
been living, or whether the applicant has been engaged in employment, the best forum for making an
accurate determination may be in the district court. See Legomsky, supra note 57, at 1323. Where
there is a mechanism for discovery, procedures are formal, and the credibility of witnesses can be
tested through cross-examination. These considerations favoring accuracy are offset, however, by
concerns for efficiency because review in a district court is obviously more expensive than the
informal administrative review established by IRCA.
64. I do not mean to suggest that there is always a "correct' legal interpretation of the relevant
statute or the Constitution. In many cases a statute is ambiguous and susceptible of various
interpretations. It is clear, however, that some interpretations are better or more accurate than others
and that some decisionmakers are more likely to interpret a statute correctly than others. Professor
Legomsky, for example, is more likely to offer a correct interpretation of § 245A(a)(3) than my
12-year-old daughter.
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In the context of the pattern and practice legalization cases, the
relevant issues that the courts have been called upon to resolve include
the following: (1) whether there is a pattern or practice of unfair or
unlawful adjudication; 5 (2) whether INS regulations are lawful and
proper, given underlying facts concerning agency practice;' and (3)
whether INS regulations are lawful as a matter of statutory
interpretation.67
In the first two types of cases, a hearing before the district court is
essential because the administrative record created in the legalization
process is inadequate for purposes of making the required factual
determinations.6 8 For example, in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,
Inc., the court noted:
To establish the unfairness of the INS practices, [plaintiffs] in this
case adduced a substantial amount of evidence, most of which
would have been irrelevant in the processing of a particular
individual application. Not only would a court of ap:peals reviewing

65. For example, in LULAC v. INS, Civ. No. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal. 1988), plaintiffs alleged
that INS had a policy of denying legalization to individuals who reentered the United States on a
nonimmigrant visa or other reentry permit after January 1, 1982. See also Campos v. Nail, 43
F.3d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Plaintiffs] alleged a pattern of conduct that was not readily
apparent in individual deportation proceedings. Only after comparing the results of numerous cases
was the unlawful policy discernible.").
66. For example, in Legalization Assistance Project of the L.A. County Fed'n of Labor v. INS,
976 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1992), plaintiffs challenged, inter alia, the INS's interpretation of the term
"known to the Government" as used in INA § 245A(a)(2)(B). See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) (1995); supra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text. In particular, the Immigration Service had defined that term so
that an applicant's unlawful status was "known to the Government" only if there was evidence
showing the unlawful status in the applicant's INS A-file. Plaintiffs were able to establish, through
discovery mechanisms not available in the legalization application process, that there were other
records maintained by the Immigration Service and available to INS officers that might include
evidence showing a violation of status. The fact that the Immigration Service maintained these
records was relevant to the determination that the INS's regulation was improper. See, e.g.,
LegalizationAssistance Project,976 F.2d at 1209.
67. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993) (challenging the
validity of an INS regulation defining "brief, casual and innocent" absences for purposes of INA
§ 245A(a)(3)); Naranjo-Aguilerav. INS, 30 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994) (challenging the validity of an
INS regulation defining the "one felony/three misdemeanor rule" for purposes of legalization under
INA § 210).
68. The administrative record created in an individual legalization application includes only the
original legalization application and supporting documentation (evidence of residence in the United
States since 1981, copy of the medical exam, etc.); notes made by the INS legalization officer at the
time of the informal interview; a report from the FBI fingerprint check; and any other additional
information incorporated into the record by the Immigration Service. See M cNary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 493 (1991). There is no opportunity for dircovery and there is no
opportunity to develop and present facts outside the particular application being presented.
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an individual... determination therefore most likely not have an
adequate record as to the pattern of INS' allegedly unconstitutional
practices, but it also would lack the factfinding and recorddeveloping capabilities of a federal district court.69
In several lawsuits, plaintiffs have alleged a pattern and practice of
unlawful "front-desking" by the Immigration Service. During the
legalization application period, applicants appearing at INS's front desk
to file applications were told that they were not eligible for the program,
and INS refused to accept their applications. In these cases, no
administrative record is created because the applications were never
accepted by the Immigration Service. Thus, the only way that a factual
record can be developed is in proceedings before the district court.70
In Legalization Assistance Project of the Los Angeles County
Federation of Labor v. INS,7 the plaintiffs challenged the INS's
definition of "known to the Government." In the course of litigation, the
plaintiffs were able to prove the existence of records maintained by the
government from which it was possible to determine that a violation of
status had occurred.72 This would have been impossible to establish in
the context of an individual legalization application, where there is no
opportunity for discovery. Thus, for purposes of determining whether
INS's interpretation of the statute was lawful, review in the district court
was essential.
As to the last category, cases in which the only issue is the validity of
a regulation, which depend only on legal analysis and not underlying
factual matters, it is arguable that the court of appeals is ultimately the
best tribunal for judicial review.73 However, as to these cases the issue of
accuracy also hinges on the timing ofjudicial review.
In the legalization program, final regulations were issued on May 1,
1987, at the outset of the legalization application period. 4 The decisions
embodied in these regulations interpreting the statute were made by INS
policymakers who were probably familiar with a range of immigration
issues but who were not necessarily lawyers nor experienced in issues of
69.
70.
71.
72.

498 U.S. at 497.
See Reno, 113 S. Ct 2485.
976 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
Id. at 1209, 1212n.31.
73. See Legomsky, supra note 57, at 1322 (arguing that legal issues are generally best handled by
a collegial forum, such as a court of appeals, rather than a single decision maker, such as a district
court).
74. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,195, at 16,204 (1987) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 210).
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statutory interpretation.' The decisions embodied in these regulations, if
not reviewable in federal district court at the outset of the legalization
program, will remain effective for many years before being challenged in
the context of an appeal of an individual case.
Thus, early review by a judicial tribunal experienced in adjudicating a
broad range of statutory interpretation cases is especially beneficial in
order to help assure that the statute has been interpreted accurately. 6
Because judicial review in the court of appeals is delayed for many years,
the only judicial forum available for reviewing the legality of INS
regulations and policies is a federal district court. For this reason,
considerations of accuracy of the interpretation of the statute argue in
favor of judicial review in the federal district court.
3.

Acceptability

In addition to an efficient and accurate process, it is also desirable that
the procedures adopted be recognized by the litigants and the general
public as fair.
According to some commentators, the system established in IRCA for
the review of individual cases does not meet the goal of acceptability."
Judicial review is conditioned on risk because an applicant can obtain
judicial review only by subjecting oneself to deportation. If the applicant
is correct and the INS's denial of the legalization application was
improper, legalization will be granted. If the applicant is incorrect,
however, the applicant will be deported from the United States. Given
this risk, it is unlikely that many undocumented applicants will step
forward to obtain judicial review. As the Supreme Court noted, "[q]uite
obviously, that price is tantamount to a complete denial of judicial
review for most undocumented aliens."" According to some, such a
mechanism for review of administrative decisions is not fair or

75. See, e.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) ("Constitutional questions obviously
are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefcre, access to the courts is
essential to the decision of such questions.").
76. This is especially true if one accepts the assessment that becatue of INS's enforcement
orientation, administrative performance is "deeply and systematically flowed." Schuck & Wang,
supra note 11, at 176-77 n.295.
77. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, JudicialReview of Amnesty DeniaI7: Must Aliens Bet Their
Lives to Get into Court?, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 53, 97 (1990).
78. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479,496-97 (1991).
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acceptable: "There is something fundamentally troubling about
conditioning justice upon risk."79
Whatever one's views about the fairness or unfairness of the scheme
established in IRCA for the review of individual legalization
applications, clearly, precluding district court review of pattern and
practice cases is unacceptable.
If judicial review is precluded, there will be no effective mechanism
for correcting egregious and widespread unlawful agency action. For
example, suppose the Immigration Service decided to restrict all
legalization benefits to persons born on the Fourth of July.80 Without
review in the district court, there would be no means to challenge such a
policy. Millions of applicants would be improperly denied. Millions
would remain in the United States in an undocumented status, and the
legalization program would be effectively destroyed.
The problem in the context of the pattern and practice cases actually
filed is, perhaps, not as egregious as the Fourth of July problem, but the
problem is clearly present and real. If there is to be no review in the
federal district courts, there will be no means to correct unlawful policies
and practices adopted by the agency which adversely affect thousands of
individuals. The agency will be able to effectively frustrate the
congressional intent of legalizing as many persons as possible.
Furthermore, a system of judicial review should promote consistency
in decisions. In pattern and practice cases, the district court can certify a
class of individuals, even a nationwide class if necessary, and treat all
individuals in the class uniformly. In this and other contexts, the class
action lawsuit provides an effective mechanism for resolving legal
disputes consistently for all affected.
In contrast, if there is no jurisdiction in the district courts and the cases
are reviewed on an individual case-by-case basis, there will be no
consistency in the decisions reached. Even if the regulation or practice is
overturned in one circuit, INS might not follow the decision in another
circuit." Moreover, there would be no means to obtain uniform results
even within the same circuit. A court of appeals invalidating a regulation
in one case has no jurisdiction to order the INS to change the decisions
made in other cases. As a result, if the district court does not hear the

79. Kanstroom, supra note 77, at 97.
80. See Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1478 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing possible
unlawful regulations in the context of benefits under the Veterans Administration Act).
81. See Koh, supranote 61.
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challenge and decide the issue on a class-wide basis, there is the very real
prospect of inconsistent results.
III. CASE LAW UNDER § 245A(F)
IRCA provides that there shall be no review of "a determination
respecting an application" for legalization except in the context of
judicial review of a final order of deportation pursuant to § 106.82 Thus,
when plaintiffs bring a pattern and practice case under IRCA, an initial
question is whether § 245A(f) bars review in the district court. In
particular, the question is whether the district court is called on to review
"a determination respecting a [legalization application]," and whether
§t245A(f) therefore prohibits review.
In McNary v. HaitianRefugee Center, Inc., 3 the Supreme Court held
that § 245A(f) does not preclude district court review of pattern and
practice cases. The Immigration Service argued that the federal district
court had no jurisdiction to hear the claims of the plaintiffs" because the
policies it adopted constituted a "determination respecting an
application" and therefore could be reviewed only by the court of appeals
pursuant to § 245A(f) and § 106. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, stating:
The critical words... describe the provision as referring only to
review "of a determination respecting an applicadon" for SAW
[special agricultural worker] status.... [H]ad Congress intended
the limited review provisions of § 210(e) [of the INA] to
encompass challenges to INS procedures and practices, it could
easily have used broader statutory language. . . . Because
[plaintiffs'] action does not seek review on the meris of a denial of
a particular application, the District Court's general federalquestion jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear this action
remains unimpaired by § 210(e)."5

82. INA § 245A(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(t)(1) (1994).
83. 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
84. The plaintiff farmworkers applying for amnesty under § 210 raised objections to the manner
in which INS processed legalization applications. Plaintiffs alleged that applicants were not apprised
of or given the opportunity to respond to adverse information or to present witnesses on their own
behalf, and that applicants were unable to communicate effectively with legalization adjudicators
because competent interpreters were not provided. Id. at 487-88.
85. Id. at491-94.
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The rationale given for this decision relied primarily on accuracy
concerns, concerns that without jurisdiction in district court, no record
adequate for purposes of judicial review could be created:
To establish the unfairness of the INS practices, [plaintiffs] in this
case adduced a substantial amount of evidence, most of which
would have been irrelevant in the processing of a particular
individual application.... [S]tatutes that provide for only a single
level of judicial review in the courts of appeals "are traditionally
viewed as warranted only in circumstances where district court
factfinding would unnecessarily duplicate an adequate
administrative record-circumstances that are not present in
'pattern and practice' cases where district court factfinding is
essential. 8 6
The Court also alluded to concerns of acceptability:
[B]ecause there is no provision for direct judicial review of the
denial of SAW status unless the alien is later apprehended and
deportation proceedings are initiated, most aliens denied SAW
status can ensure themselves review in courts of appeals only if
they voluntarily surrender themselves for deportation. Quite
obviously, that price is tantamount to a complete denial of judicial
review for most undocumented aliens.
A system in which claims are effectively precluded from judicial review
is not acceptable. 8
The jurisdictional issue in pattern and practice cases should have been
put to rest by the Court's decision in McNary. Nevertheless, the Court
revisited the jurisdictional issue in Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.
(CSS)89 and laid the groundwork for subsequent confusion.
In CSS, plaintiffs challenged INS regulations defining "brief, casual
and innocent" departures from the United States for purposes of
§t245A(a)(3)(B). 90 According to the INS regulations, a "brief, casual and
86. Id. at 497 (quoting from ABA, Amicus Curiae Brief).

87. Id. at 496-97.
88. The Court should not be taken to mean that whenever the review scheme is "tantamount to a
complete denial of judicial review" jurisdiction in the district courts must be allowed. Such a result
would, as the Court clearly recognized, be inconsistent with the statute. Rather, the Court indicates
that in those types of cases where district court review is not clearly precluded by § 245A(f), district
court review should be allowed if the claims would otherwise be effectively precluded from judicial
review.
89. 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993).

90. Id. at2490.
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innocent" departure required advance permission from the Immigration
Service before the departure." Plaintiffs alleged that many applicants had
been "front-desked",92 that is, deterred from filing because of INS's
practices. At the district court level, the court not only invalidated the
INS regulation but also extended the application deadline for the benefit
of persons who had been deterred from filing because of INS's
regulation. On appeal, the Immigration Service, while not contesting the
fact that the regulation was unlawful, argued that the district court lacked
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court first reiterated its holding in MaNary, stating that
§ 245A(f) does not preclude district court jurisdiction over pattern and
practice cases.93 The Court went on to hold, however, that as to
individuals deterred from filing applications, there remained an issue of
ripeness. Individuals challenging agency action can do so only if the
controversy is ripe, and the Court felt that the mere promulgation of
regulations does not create a sufficiently ripe controversy as to
individuals who decided not to file an application for legalization.
Injunctive and declaratory judgment remedies are discretionary, and
"courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to administrative
determinations unless these arise in the context of a controversy 'ripe'
for judicial resolution."9 4 The mere promulgation of regulations would
not have prevented the plaintiffs from filing applications for legalization,
and would not have given the plaintiffs a ripe claim.95
Of course, when the INS applies the regulation by denying an
application, then the plaintiff's claim becomes ripe. However:
A plaintiff who sought to rely on the denial of his application to
satisfy the ripeness requirement.., would then still find himself at
least temporarily barred by the Reform Act's exclusive review
provisions, since he would be seeking "judicial review of a
determination respecting an application."... The ripeness doctrine
and the Reform Act's jurisdictional provisions would thus dovetail
neatly, and not necessarily by mere coincidence. Congress may
well have assumed that, in the ordinary case, the courts would not
hear a challenge to regulations specifying limits to eligibility before
those regulations were actually applied to an individual, whose
91. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
93. 113 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
94. Id. at 2495 (quoting Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)).
95. Id. at 2496.
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challenge to the denial of an individual application would proceed
within the Reform Act's limited scheme.96
This last passage has created confusion. In light of it, CSS can be
interpreted in several ways, none of them satisfying. The first
interpretation is that perhaps the Court is holding that the district court
has jurisdiction under § 245A(f) whenever a plaintiff, an individual or a
class, brings a lawsuit challenging a regulation or policy affecting many
applicants. The Court is merely pointing out that in "the ordinary case,"
after an application has been denied, an individual will be seeking
approval of his or her legalization application, which entails review of
the "determination" made on the application, and thus will be subject to
the review mechanism established in § 245A(f)" The second
interpretation is that the Court may be holding that district courts have
jurisdiction under § 245A(f) to hear a pattern and practice case only if a
suit is brought by a class of plaintiffs. An individual seeking relief is
barred by the judicial review provisions of IRCA, because relief in such
a case is limited to the "determination" made in that case.98 Third, the
Court may be holding that whether review is available in the district
court depends on the type of challenge brought by the plaintiffs. If the
plaintiffs are challenging a collateral or procedural aspect of the
legalization process, then the district court has jurisdiction. However, if
plaintiffs are challenging a substantive eligibility requirement, then there
is no jurisdiction.9 Fourth, the Court may be holding that the district
96. Id. at 2497.
97. Under this interpretation, the district court has jurisdiction to hear the claims presented by an
individual or by a class of individuals only if the plaintiffs are not seeking a determination on the
merits of any individual legalization application, but are seeking only an order preventing the INS
from implementing the unlawful regulation. This interpretation is consistent with the statutory
language of § 245A(f), although it does open up the possibility of an unwanted plethora of lawsuits
that can be filed on an individual basis.
98. This interpretation is consistent with the statutory language. Although it precludes piecemeal
individual litigation, this does not significantly undermine the objectives of judicial review, and
actually facilitates efficient handling of the cases to the extent that it forces plaintiffs to band
together as a group to have the legal issues affecting them as a class resolved uniformly and
simultaneously.
99. The only plausibility this interpretation has is that it is a facile way of distinguishing McNary
(a procedural challenge) from CSS (a challenge to substantive eligibility requirements) on the facts.
This interpretation makes no sense in terms of the statutory language used by Congress in § 245A.
There is no reason to say that the procedures adopted by INS and applied generally do not constitute
a "determination respecting an application" whereas regulations adopted and applied generally do.
See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 492-93 (1991) (abuse of discretion
standard required under § 245A(f) for review of a "determination" applies neither to judicial review
of procedures nor to judicial review of the legality of regulations). The interpretation makes even
less sense in terms of the objectives ofjudicial review. See supra part II.B.
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court's jurisdiction to hear pattern and practice cases is not limited by
§ 245A(f), but that the court should also take into account prudential
considerations, such as ripeness. If there are significant prudential
considerations counselling against jurisdiction, then the district court
should decline to hear the case." Finally, perhaps the Court is signalling,
more generally, that pre-enforcement review of the substantive eligibility
requirements of a government benefit program is disfavored, and that
plaintiffs who seek to challenge the legality of such eligibility
requirements do not have ripe claims unless they are "'front-desked" or
apply and are denied."'1
The courts of appeals have interpreted McNary and CSS in two
subsequent legalization cases. In Ayuda, Inc. v. Reno,10 2 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia read CSS as holding that § 245A(f)
permits pattern and practice challenges only if the plaintiffs raise
"procedural" challenges that "could not receive practical judicial review"
under § 245A."0 Challenges to substantive eligibility requirements are
not permissible. 1 4 In Naranjo-Aguilera,0 5 the Ninth Circuit followed
Ayuda:
First, district courts have jurisdiction over "collateral,"
"procedural" challenges to INS practices in the processing of
applications, such as the front-desking in CSS or the denial of
interpreters in McNary....Where plaintiffs challenge alleged INS
application-processing practices on a nationwide scale, a class
action lawsuit with district court discovery mechanisms is an

100. This interpretation is perhaps the most sensible way to reconcile McNary and CSS. In
McNary, the Court quite clearly held that the district courts have jurisdicion to hear pattern and
practice cases that present "constitutional or statutory claims." 498 U.S. et 493. CSS affirms this
holding. However, in the context of a class of plaintiffs who did not file applications during the
application period, see 113 S.Ct. at 2498 n.23, the court holds that such plaintiffs may not have ripe
claims and remands to the district court for a determination of which clas:; members do have ripe
claims. 113 S.Ct. at 2500.
101. Under this interpretation, statutes such as § 245A(f), which limits judicial review, will
continue to be interpreted narrowly. However, expanding the scope of Ihe ripeness doctrine to
preclude otherwise cognizable challenges to an agency's regulations undermines the goals of
efficiency, accuracy, and acceptability. Early judicial review is beneficial -particularly to programs
with a limited application period. Where the agency has clearly stated the substantive eligibility
requirements, with no doubts about how the regulations will be applied, there is no reason to delay
judicial review until after specific applications have been denied or "f'ont-desked".
102. 7 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
103. Id. at 249.

104. Id.
105. Naranjo-Aguilera v. INS, 30 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994).
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appropriate, and indeed the most effective, method of judicial
review.
Second, however, the "neat dovetailing" of ripeness doctrine and
IRCA's exclusive review provisions . . . forecloses aliens from
challenging INS regulations or policies interpreting IRCA's
substantive eligibility criteria, except on appeal from an order of
deportation.' °6
Thus, the state of the law, at least in the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit, is that challenges going to INS procedures used in adjudicating
legalization applications can be brought in the district court, whereas
challenges to substantive eligibility requirements can be brought only on
a case-by-case basis under § 106.107
The decisions in Ayuda and Naranjo-Aguilera are not well reasoned.
The conclusion in these cases is clearly not mandated by the statutory
language contained in § 245A(f). Nor is the result required under
McNary and CSS, the relevant Supreme Court precedents. Furthermore,
the effect of these decisions is that unlawful regulations and practices
adopted by INS will remain in place for years, to be corrected only on an
individual, case-by-case basis. In effect, Congress's desire to legalize
broad classes of individuals will be thwarted. It is not likely that
Congress intended this result when it enacted § 245A.
What is required but missing in these cases is an analysis of the
considerations described above regarding whether review in the district
court is appropriate given the considerations of efficiency, accuracy, and
acceptability. Neither the Ayuda court nor the Naranjo-Aguilera court
give consideration to these factors."0 8 The better interpretation is to limit
§ 245A(f) to individual factual determinations dealing with "the denial of
an individual application"" and to allow the district court to resolve
pattern and practice cases affecting a large class of applicants.1

106. 30 F.3d at 1112-13. More recently, the Second Circuit has followed this interpretation. See
Perales v. Reno, 48 F.3d 1305 (2d Cir.1995).
107. The rule in the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit is at odds with the rule in the Seventh
Circuit. See Morales v. INS, 952 F.2d 954, 956-57 (7th Cir. 1991) (challenge to regulation allowed).
108. The decisions in these two cases focus on only one of the relevant considerations: whether
the administrative record created in the context of an individual application will be adequate for
purposes of making a determination on the relevant factual inquiries. Other factors that should be
considered are ignored.
109. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479,491 (1991).
110. See Kenneth C. Davis, 5 Administrative Law § 28:14, at 325 (2d ed. 1984) ("A massive
number of cases thatfall intopatterns affords opportunitynot only for greaterefficiency than what
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IV. CONCLUSION
The decisions made by an administrative agency are often shaped by
political and bureaucratic forces which can be at odds with legislation
passed by Congress. We have seen this scenario occur in the legalization
program, where Congress's desire for a generous legalization program
was to a large extent thwarted by an enforcement-minded agency. We are
bound to see this occur in the future in other immigration contexts as
well. Ultimately, it is the federal courts that force the agency to act in a
lawful manner, within the scope of the authority delegated by Congress
and consistently with the Constitution."' The fact that administrative
action is constrained in this manner helps to legitimate the actions taken
by the INS.
For this reason, judicial review of the policies and practices adopted
by an administrative agency is essential. Of course, there are legitimate
questions regarding the cost of judicial review, the best method of
providing for judicial review, and the optimal mechanism for judicial
review in individual cases. As argued above, though, district court
review of pattern and practice lawsuits should generally be allowed.
Among the goals of a system of administrative and judicial review are
efficiency, accuracy, and acceptability. In determining whether a district
court has jurisdiction to hear pattern and practice cases, the court's role
in the overall system of administrative and judicial review should be
evaluated in light of these three goals. Where there is a pattern and
practice of agency action adversely affecting many individuals, district
courts should ordinarily be allowed to accept jurisdiction and to grant
class-wide relief where the agency has been acting unlawfully. Such
action will generally promote the efficiency, accuracy, and acceptability
of the review process.

is attainable through an ordinary court trial but also for greater accuracy in finding facts and
applying law.') (emphasis in original).
111. "[A] main purpose ofjudicial review of administrative action is to assure that administrators
do whatever is required for procedural and substantive justice. Reviewing courts are the experts on
the content ofprocedural and substantivejustice." Id. § 28:7, at 285 (emphasis in original).

804

